run-time recognition and handling of intentions seems essential for human-agent cooperation and communication. For while we may design a software agent that follows some particular communication protocol, we cannot assume that the human knows that protocol or would be inclined to abide by it, at least in cases where user messages cannot be directly constrained. Second, elevating the level of analysis from the individual performative to protocols (which we think is an important step) only moves the set of problems back a level. There is currently no consensus here either on what the primitive protocols are, let alone their semantics. Although this matter is in principle resolvable, protocols can only maintain what we call local coherence--some unity between very short sequences of messages.
When message exchange expands beyond 2-3 message sequences, there must be some way to ensure global coherence to the entire conversation, i.e., a coherence to the way in which very short message sequences are, crudely put, patched together. Focusing on protocols alone will not fully constrain the messages that are sent. While protocol definitions do this locally, they do not do this globally. In short, much of the current focus puts protocols in the foreground, with the implicit assumption that such protocols will work effectively for any task. We argue for a reverse approach: only after there is a model of the joint task does it make sense to design protocols that encapsulate the dialogue needed to accomplish the joint task. Much of the effort aimed at establishing the syntax, the standards, and the technical details of protocol execution fails to recall that the main reason for the move to protocols was because there was no universal semantics for message types.
Although we fully believe that precise semantics are crucial for individual performatives and protocols, the full illocutionary force of a message sequence--its semantics with respect to the task being performed--will be under constrained. We are proposing that the way to go about semantics is to analyze communication in the context of cooperation. When two agents cooperate, they have a joint task they must achieve together. Any communication that arises is to achieve common knowledge about the beliefs, goals, intentions and plans of the agents who are attempting to cooperate. We propose that the root of the problem (and the solution) is to model the task which agents are trying to achieve. Simply put, the only way to constrain messages is to constrain and delimit task intentions, which in turn can delimit communication intentions. We further believe that it is possible to group these joint tasks into what we call abstract task types so that the actual domain itself does not have to be modeled. For us, an abstract task is something like "scheduling," "negotiation", "database search", or "diagnosis." We think that it is reasonable to assume that two agents come to a cooperative venture knowing that their (abstract) task is one of search, negotiation, diagnosis, or whatever. Regardless of what the actual domain content and domain ontology is, two cooperating agents must share an ontology for the abstract task they are jointly solving, and this ontology is different from the ontology for the actual domain.
OVERVIEW
We advocate a pragmatic approach to specifying an abstract task specification that begins with a problem formulation using a traditional state-space representation. Under this view, problemsolving is movement through a state space, where each state has a direct or indirect correspondence to a world state. Such a formulation requires (a) a goal test that indicates whether a state (or path to a state) constitutes a problem solution, (b) a specification of an initial state, and (c) the specification of operators as functions performed on one state to produce a successor state. Task actions or operators are realized as inspectable preconditions that must match features in state s and inspectable post-conditions that define the transformation of state s into some successor state.
Generally speaking, these operators define the complete set of task actions about which either agent can be committed to take. In this way, they define and delimit the complete set of task intentions. The commitment to a task intention does not entail being able to satisfy it via the execution of an appropriate task operator. The shared task model, by reference to agent functionality, indicates which agent can bring about the satisfaction of a particular precondition. The agent that does not possess information it needs to execute its (intended) task operator would form a communication intention to communicate with the agent that does have that information. Conversely, any agent with such information can (or must) offer the information to the agent which needs it. Thus, any task operator's precondition is a possible object of communication. Objects of communication are topics that may or must be talked about, depending on each agent's role and which agent knows what. A second set of possible communication intentions are defined by a task operator's postconditions that define a new successor state. They are necessary objects of communication if the agent without direct access to progress in the task needs to know about such progress, in order to fulfill its role. There are also different task models that have different specifications indicating that certain post conditions of task-operators are not to be shared. Many agent applications involve what we might call "private" computations. Agents that share a common task model in which this is specified can explicitly "know" that their communication intentions must exclude queries about these private results. In sum, once you have a state-space formulation for a problem and a specification of agent functionality, you can derive in a pragmatic but principled way a delimited set of task intentions as well as the necessary, possible, or forbidden communication intentions.
Under our framework, we model task intentions and communication intentions as two distinct state spaces. Protocols are the realizations of operators in each of these two spaces. A protocol defines a structured exchange of information between two agents. A task protocol is defined as a set of input parameters, that include a given state, and a set of output parameters, which fully define the successor state. Communication protocols advance communication intentions and move the agents through communication space, which includes shared knowledge. They specify temporal and contextual conditions on what message performatives, defined in some ACL, may follow each other.
Several researchers have specified semantics at the protocol-level, realized as pre-, post-, and completion conditions for the primitive performatives. There is a correspondence between these ideas and semantics for abstract task intentions and protocols, except that task intentions concern how to advance the task, given the agent's beliefs about the current task state, and communication protocols are then called in service of the intention. We argue for separating communication semantics from task semantics. It is only the abstract task intentions that provide any coherence across the 2-or 3-message pairings that are defined by communication protocols. Furthermore, communication protocols are ultimately executed in service of advancing a communication intention, which in turn relates to a task intention; in our model, control is returned to the level of intention processing, regardless of whether a protocol completes in a pre-defined manner or is temporarily suspended (along with its associated intention). Most proposals for semantics at the protocol level define what, in our framework, would be updates to communication space variables. The extended perlocutionary effects of a successfully executed communication protocol, in our framework, are specified as changes first to the communication space and then, through the associated task intention, as changes to the task space.
The abstract task analysis supports a flexible and pragmatic handling of "unexpected" messages. While a message may be unexpected in the context of some protocol, it cannot be undefined in the context of the abstract task specification that is jointly held by the two agents. A messages that is unexpected at the level of a protocol causes the protocol to be suspended and the message is resolved at the level of possible task or communication intentions. An abstract task model may also specify agent roles in terms of their functionality in supplying or needing to know elements of the state-space representation for the problem. Some of the nuances associated with request messages that seem to render them into commands or suggests might, we believe, be derived in part from agent roles as given in the task specification.
Using this abstract task model approach, we implemented an agent-assistant for mixed-initiative successive search task using a BDI architecture. In this architecture, a plan library defines a set of plans that implement task intentions, communication intentions, and communication protocols. The agent maps incoming messages to task or communication intentions; it sets its own task or communication intentions from features of the current task and communication state. Communication protocols are restricted to simple adjacent message pairs; semantics associated with these communication protocols (and the associated communication intention) are realized as update procedures that execute when and if the protocol is successfully completed. Abstract task semantics are realized as the update procedures associated with task protocols that bring about the satisfaction of task intentions.
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